Appellate Court Cannot Remand Case to Trial Court Only for Sentencing: SC

The Supreme Court has clarified that when an appellate court reverses an acquittal and records a conviction for the first time, it must itself hear the convict on the question of sentence rather than remanding the matter to the trial court.

A bench of Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Vijay Bishnoi addressed the procedural impropriety of remanding matters solely for the determination of punishment. The Court emphasized that such a move contradicts the mandate of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and established judicial precedents.

Mandatory Hearing on Sentence by Convicting Court

The Apex Court highlighted that the judicial function of imposing an appropriate sentence is a bounden duty of the court that records the conviction. Referring to Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the bench noted that the requirement of hearing the accused satisfies the rules of natural justice, ensuring fair play by allowing the convict to provide data relevant to the quantum of punishment.

The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "The appellate court which will include the High Court, in a given scenario, while recording a conviction after reversing the acquittal, should adjourn the matter to a suitable date, hear the convicts, and impose an appropriate sentence itself. The appellate court cannot relegate the matter to the court below only for the purpose of imposing a sentence after the appellate court had recorded a conviction. That will be contrary to Section 386(a), CrPC., and the judgments of this Court."

High Court's Error in Procedure

The judgment arose from a Calcutta High Court decision where, after reversing an acquittal in a case involving Section 376 and Section 312 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the High Court directed the accused to surrender before the Trial Judge for sentencing. The Supreme Court found this procedure "unknown to law."

Background:

The appellant was initially acquitted by the Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, for offences under Sections 376, 312, and 417 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This acquittal was challenged by both the State and the victim in the High Court at Calcutta (Circuit Bench at Port Blair). The High Court found the appellant guilty of sexual abuse on a false pretext of marriage and forced termination of pregnancy. However, instead of sentencing the convict, the High Court remitted the matter to the trial court.

The Supreme Court relied on Allauddin Mian and Others Sharif Mian and Another v. State of Bihar ( "(1989) 3 SCC 5": 1989 CaseBase(SC) 367) and Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra ( "(1977) 3 SCC 68": 1977 CaseBase(SC) 257) to reiterate that while the trial court follows Section 235(2), an appellate court reversing an acquittal must follow Section 386(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court further cited Kumar Exports Vs. Sharma Carpets ( "(2009) 2 SCC 513": 2008 CaseBase(SC) 1572), which explicitly states that the judicial discretion of imposing sentence cannot be abdicated by the High Court in favor of a Magistrate. Consequently, the Apex Court set aside the High Court's direction regarding the remand and restored the appeals to the High Court file for the limited purpose of hearing the convict on sentence.

Case Details:
Case No.: CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2863-2864 of 2026
Case Title: Mukesh Kumar Yadav Versus The State (UT of Andaman & Nicobar Islands) Etc.
Appearances:
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Rauf Rahim, Senior Counsel
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Kunal Chatterji, Counsel (Victim); Mr. Mukesh Kumar Verma, Counsel (State)

Source: 2026 CaseBase(SC) 482