Civil Appeal Holds Plaintiffs’ Suit Time-Barred; High Court and First Appellate Decrees Set Aside, Trial Court Order Restored

A bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Prashant Kumar Mishra heard the special leave appeal arising from ongoing family disputes over a Muzaffarnagar two‑storey building, challenging the Allahabad High Court’s dismissal of the second appeal and the first appellate court’s decree which had reversed the trial court. The petitioners (second to fifth defendants below) assailed a first appellate decree that had granted recovery of possession to plaintiffs who sued for cancellation of two 1992 sale deeds, recovery of possession and injunction.

The Court held that the plaintiffs’ suit, instituted in 2003, was barred by limitation and restored the trial court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs had relied on a registered will but failed to prove its execution in accordance with law; the sale deeds executed and registered in June 1992 were not ipso facto void for lis pendens and the appellants were found to be bona fide purchasers entitled to protection under the Transfer of Property Act. The Court further held that the first appellate court erred in decreeing possession without an effective declaration or cancellation of the disputed instruments. The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "Insertion by the Parliament of the word 'first' under the column 'Time from which period begins to run' in Article 58 is not without a purpose. Such word, which was not there in the Limitation Act, 1908, has been designedly used in Article 58 to signify that a suit to obtain declaration ... has to be instituted within three years of 'when the right to sue first accrues'. ... The period of limitation in terms of Article 58 being 3 (three) years, the prescribed period has to be counted from that date of the right to sue first accruing and the suit, if not instituted within 3 (three) years therefrom, would become barred by time." The Court also noted that "The civil suit of the plaintiffs having been instituted in 2003, it was hopelessly barred by limitation."

Background The dispute concerned House No. 49/1, Nai Mandi, Muzaffarnagar, which the plaintiffs traced to a will allegedly executed by their common ancestor in 1951/1958. Ramesh Chand, one of the testator’s sons, was said to have no share in the house under the will. In 1956 a family settlement and municipal mutations occurred; after successive family suits and compromises during the 1980s–1990s, Ramesh Chand executed two registered sale deeds on 16 and 29 June 1992 in favour of the present appellants who took possession. Plaintiffs filed the subject suit in February 2003 for cancellation of the 1992 sale deeds, recovery of possession and injunction. The trial court dismissed the suit on multiple grounds including failure to prove the will and that the suit was barred by limitation (treating cancellation as the substantive relief under Article 59). The first appellate court reversed and decreed possession for plaintiffs, treating the sale deeds as void and relying on lis pendens and admissions in earlier family suits. The High Court, on the plaintiffs’ second appeal, set aside the first appellate decree and restored the trial court’s dismissal, holding the suit to be within Article 65 limitation only if relief of possession stood as primary; the Supreme Court disagreed with the first appellate court’s approach.

The Supreme Court examined limitation law, distinguishing Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act and relevant authorities, and observed that where registered sale deeds were executed and the vendee entered into possession, the right to sue in respect of cancellation accrued when the right to sue first accrued — here in June 1992 — and a suit filed in 2003 was time‑barred. The Court held that the will was not proved by primary evidence and that the plaintiffs could not rely on the 30‑year presumption (Section 90A) because the will formed the basis of their suit. The Court also recorded that Section 52 (lis pendens) did not automatically render the 1992 transfers void and reiterated that "nemo dat quod non habet" was relevant to the factual matrix but appellants were bona fide purchasers protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court and first appellate decrees and restored the trial court’s dismissal; parties were left to bear their own costs.

Case Details: Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 11061 of 2024; 2025 INSC 552 Case Title: Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors. Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Gulati, Senior Counsel For the Respondent(s): Mr. Kumar, Counsel