Delhi High Court declines to quash departmental inquiry for delay but directs its expeditious completion

A bench of Justice Anil Khetarpal and Justice Amit Mahajan heard a writ petition challenging an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal which had refused to quash a charge memorandum dated 21.05.2021 and the disciplinary proceedings initiated thereunder. The petition raised primarily whether non-compliance with Rule 14(24) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and alleged inordinate delay vitiated the inquiry, and whether the charge memorandum suffered from non-application of mind by the disciplinary authority.

The High Court dismissed the petition and held that the Tribunal did not commit any jurisdictional error in declining to quash the charge memo or the disciplinary proceedings. The Court explained that Rule 14(24) prescribed a time-frame for inquiries but did not provide that proceedings would ipso facto abate on expiry, and that delay, by itself, did not vitiate proceedings unless it caused prejudice, was inordinate or actuated by mala fides. The Court directed that the inquiry must be concluded within the time stipulated by the Tribunal and observed that the Tribunal’s direction "subserves the very objective underlying Rule 14(24) of the Rules, namely expeditious conclusion of proceedings." The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope of interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that judicial review, at the stage of issuance of a charge memorandum or during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, is limited to examining whether the proceedings suffer from jurisdictional error, patent illegality, mala fides, or violation of statutory provisions of a nature that goes to the root of the matter. The writ court does not ordinarily embark upon an examination of the correctness or sufficiency of the material forming the basis of the charge, nor does it adjudicate upon disputed questions of fact. Interference at the stage of issuance of a charge memorandum is warranted only where the same is shown to be wholly without jurisdiction, vitiated by mala fides, or in patent violation of statutory provisions going to the root of the matter." The Court further noted that "delay in disciplinary proceedings, by itself, does not vitiate the proceedings unless it is shown that such delay is inordinate and unexplained and has caused prejudice to the delinquent officer or is actuated by mala fides."

Background:
The petitioner was a direct recruit officer who rose to the post of Additional Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax and had served on deputation to SEEPZ as Deputy/Joint Development Commissioner and Estate Manager/Secretary to the Authority. After a vigilance advice from the Central Vigilance Commission dated 18.07.2019 and subsequent files from the Department of Commerce, the respondent ministry issued a charge memorandum on 21.05.2021 containing five Articles of Charge alleging irregularities in tendering, allocation and allotments, and reliance on selected consultants during repairs. The petitioner contended that the charge memo was issued nearly two years after the first stage CVC advice, that the disciplinary authority mechanically approved a draft prepared by the borrowing department, that Rule 14(24) was not complied with as the inquiry exceeded the prescribed timeframe without written extension, and that Rule 20 and other provisions were breached. He also alleged prejudice in promotion prospects and sought quashing of the proceedings. The respondents defended the proceedings, contending that Rule 14(24) did not render proceedings void on mere expiry, that administrative exigencies explained delay, that the disciplinary authority had considered the material before approval, and that whether acts constituted misconduct required inquiry and evidence. The Tribunal had declined to quash the proceedings and ordered completion of the inquiry within six months; the High Court upheld that approach and dismissed the petition while expecting adherence to the time prescription and noting that proceedings post-retirement could continue for pensionary consequences.

Case Details:
Case No.: W.P.(C) 13870/2024
Case Title: VIJAI PRAKASH SHUKLA v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
Appearances:
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. R.V. Sinha; Ms. A.S. Singh, Advocates
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Jitendra Kumar Tripathi; Mr. Sumit Kumar Raj; Ms. Anjali Dwivedi, Advocates for UOI; Mr. Sushil Kumar Pandey, SPC with Ms. Sheela Chaudhari, AC AD-5

Source: 2026 CaseBase(DEL) 73