Extradition Assurance does not mean accelerated computation of sentence: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court refused the benefit of accelerated computation of sentence for alleged assurance during extradition. The Apex Court affirmed that an executive commitment to a foreign nation merely binds the State to consider executive clemency upon completing the stipulated period without altering the underlying judicial decree of life imprisonment. 

A bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta dismissed a plea challenging a High Court order that rejected a habeas corpus petition. The Apex Court addressed the tricky interplay between sovereign extradition commitments, concurrent sentencing, and executive remissions. 

Court Observations and Directions 

The Supreme Court affirmed that sentences granted concurrently operate simultaneously, meaning the exact same period of incarceration cannot be counted twice to calculate completion of a sentence. Emphasizing the national impact of the crimes, the Bench noted that the offenses were intended to destabilize the nation and undermine its economic financial hub. 

The Apex Court emphasized that "The assurance so given was that the appellant would not be subjected to the death penalty or imprisonment beyond 25 years. This commitment was expressly taken note of by this Court in its judgment dated 11th July, 2022. The commitment, however, cannot be construed as conferring upon the appellant a right to an artificial or accelerated computation of the period of incarceration. The assurance fixes the outer limit of imprisonment and it does not permit periods of custody to be counted twice or otherwise contrary to the manner directed by this Court." 

Addressing the interaction between judicial sentencing and executive assurances under Constitution of India, the Supreme Court further noted: "The sovereign assurance extended by the Union Government to the Government of Portugal was an act of the Executive in the context of the appellant’s extradition, whereas the sentence imposed by the TADA Court was an exercise of judicial power, determining the punishment commensurate with the offences of which the appellant stood convicted... This Court did not convert the appellant’s sentence of life imprisonment into a sentence of 25 years. It merely recognised the sovereign assurance given by the Union Government and directed that, upon completion of 25 years, the Executive would be required to consider the exercise of its powers under Article 72 of the Constitution or, as the case may be, Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC." 

The Court issued the following directions: 

"The present appeal stands dismissed in limine." 

Background 

The dispute arose from the extradition of the appellant from Portugal to India in November 2005. Extradition was granted after a solemn sovereign assurance was conveyed by the Indian Government to Portugal in December 2002 that the appellant would neither face the death penalty nor imprisonment exceeding 25 years. Following extradition, the appellant was tried and convicted by the Special Court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 in two separate cases of TADA and BBC, and sentenced to rigorous life imprisonment in both, with the sentences ordered to run concurrently. 

In earlier proceedings, the Supreme Court in Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari v. State of Maharashtra held that the appellant's period of detention for sentence computation commenced from October 12, 2005, and rejected set-off claims under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for foreign incarceration. However, the Court had observed that upon completing 25 years of sentence, the Central Government must consider advising the President under Section 72 of Constitution of India or exercise powers under Section 432 and Section 433 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for remission or commutation. 

The appellant subsequently filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay seeking habeas corpus and mandamus for immediate release, claiming he had completed over 26 years by combining undertrial custody, post-conviction custody, and 3 years, 6 months, and 2 days of jail-earned remission. The High Court dismissed the petition, prompting the present appeal under Article 136 of Constitution of India. 

The Supreme Court found the appellant's computation flawed due to accelerated computation of sentence, double-counting of overlapping periods between his two concurrent convictions. Rejecting reliance on precedents like Yovehel v. State of Maharashtra, Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan ( "(2016) 7 SCC 1": 2015 CaseBase(SC) 480), and Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka ( "(2008) 13 SCC 767": 2008 CaseBase(SC) 1365), the Apex Court held that precedents cannot be applied divorced from their factual matrix involving extradition commitments. Finding no infirmity in the High Court's ruling, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in limine. 

Case Details: 

Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 12871 of 2026) 

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 982 

Case Title: Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. 

Appearances: 

For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Rishi Malhotra, Senior Advocate; Mr. Prem Malhotra, AOR 

Source: 2026 CaseBase(SC) 6990