Magistrate Cannot Take Cognizance Without Sanction Where Public Servant Acted in Official Capacity, Supreme Court Holds

A bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma heard an appeal against the Allahabad High Court's refusal to quash a summoning order and chargesheet in a sexual harassment-related prosecution, challenging whether proceedings could proceed against a public servant in the absence of prior sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC.

The Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial court erred in taking cognizance against the appellant — a BIS officer who acted as Presiding Officer of an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) while on deputation at FSSAI — without the prior sanction required under Section 197. The Court found that the alleged acts were connected to the performance of official duties, and that the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), the competent authority, had ultimately denied sanction for prosecution. The Court rejected the contention that a "deemed sanction" arose for want of a timely decision, observing that "Section 197 of CrPC does not envisage a concept of deemed sanction." The Court, in its reasoning, observed: “The most important question which must be posed and answered by the Court when dealing with the argument that sanction is not forthcoming is whether the officer was acting in the exercise of his official duties. It goes further. Even an officer who acts in the purported exercise of his official power is given the protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. … In fact, the requirement of the action being bona fide is not expressly stated in Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., though it is found in many other statutes protecting public servants from action, civil and criminal against them.” The Court concluded that the necessary sanction not having been granted vitiated the initiation of criminal proceedings and therefore quashed the chargesheet, summoning order and consequent steps qua the appellant.

Background The complainant, a former FSSAI Associate Director, filed FIR No.610/2018 alleging sexual harassment by another officer and naming multiple accused. An ICC inquiry in 2014–15 found the accused guilty and recommended FIR registration. The appellant joined FSSAI on deputation in April 2016 and was appointed Presiding Officer of the ICC in May 2016; she filed a counter-affidavit before the Central Administrative Tribunal defending the ICC report, which the complainant later said was filed without her consent. The complainant alleged further that the appellant threatened and pressured her to withdraw the case. The complainant filed an FIR on 30.10.2018; the appellant was not named initially but her name appeared in the complainant’s Section 164 statement recorded on 14.10.2020. A chargesheet dated 02.07.2022 named the appellant as an accused and listed offences under various IPC provisions; the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons on 06.10.2022.

The appellant petitioned under Section 482 CrPC before the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of the chargesheet and summoning order; the High Court dismissed the petition but allowed liberty to approach the Magistrate and directed release on bail. Before this Court, the appellant argued that as a BIS employee acting in official capacity she required prior sanction for prosecution and that the Investigating Officer sent the sanction request to FSSAI rather than BIS, causing delay. BIS received the request late, sought records and ultimately, by letter dated 14.11.2022, concluded the appellant was "in no way related to the allegations" and denied sanction. The State and the complainant relied on decisions such as Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy to argue that failure to secure sanction in time could amount to a deemed sanction; the Supreme Court distinguished those authorities and held no legal recognition for "deemed sanction" under Section 197.

Relying on precedents including Gurmeet Kaur, Amod Kumar Kanth and Amrik Singh, the Court treated the question as fact-sensitive and found that the appellant’s actions were indisputably connected to her official duty, making prior sanction a condition precedent to cognizance. The Court therefore quashed the proceedings insofar as they related to the appellant.

Case Details: Case No.: 2025 INSC 267 Case Title: Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): Ms. Rebecca John, Senior Counsel For the Respondent(s): State Counsel (name not specified in judgment); Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate (for complainant)