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SC Restores Eviction Order; Clarifies Limits of Revisional Jurisdiction

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A bench of Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice R. Mahadevan heard an appeal challenging the High Court's decision that had set aside an eviction order arising from a lease and alleged unauthorised sub-letting of commercial premises.

The Court allowed the appeal and restored the trial court's eviction order, holding that the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence. The Court emphasised that revisional jurisdiction under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 was supervisory and could not be equated with appellate powers, and it relied on earlier authorities to the same effect including Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh, Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others, Rai Chand Jain v. Chandra Kanta Khosla, M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan, Thankamony Amma and others v. Omana Amma N. and others and Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval to reinforce that interference on facts was permissible only where findings were perverse, based on no evidence or vitiated by illegality. 

The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity."

Background

The dispute arose from a registered long-term lease executed in 1983 and a subsequent registered lease dated 22.02.1985 in respect of a shop at Maruthi Plaza, Chickpet, Bengaluru. The landlord (now represented by legal heirs) petitioned for eviction under Sections 27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, alleging that the original tenant had unlawfully parted with possession and that strangers were in exclusive occupation. The trial Court examined oral and documentary evidence, found that the persons in actual occupation were strangers to the original tenancy and that there was no landlord's consent to sub-letting, and allowed eviction. The High Court allowed revision under Section 46 and set aside the eviction order, whereupon the landlord appealed to this Court.

The Supreme Court analysed the scope of revisional jurisdiction and held that Section 46 could be used to test legality, correctness or propriety but could not be turned into an appeal; for ease of reference, the Court quoted the provision as it appeared in the judgment: "46. Revision.- (1) The High Court may, at any time call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Small Causes or the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division referred to in items (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of section 3 for the purpose satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit." The Court found that the High Court had reappreciated evidence, thereby transgressing its limited revisional role, and restored the trial Court's order directing eviction.

On the substantive question of sub-letting, the Court reiterated settled principles: the landlord bore the initial burden of proving parting with possession in favour of a third party and, once exclusive possession by a stranger was established, the onus shifted to the tenant to show that the arrangement was bona fide. To that end the Court relied on authorities governing sub-letting and burden of proof including Associated Hotels of India Ltd v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, Jagan Nath (D) through LRs v. Chander Bhan and another, Mahendra Saree Emporium (II) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy, Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur, Ram Murti Devi v. Pushpa Devi and others, Amar Nath Agarwalla v. Dhillon Transport Agency and Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and others v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and others, and it applied the tests distilled in those precedents to conclude that the original tenant had divested legal possession and that the alleged reconstitution of partnership was a cloak to conceal unlawful transfer. The Court thus held that unlawful sub-letting stood proved and that the arrangement could not be regarded as a mere reconstitution of partnership, drawing upon the analysis in Amar Nath Agarwalla v. Dhillon Transport Agency and Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and others v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and others on partnership devices and on the line of decisions in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar and Jagan Nath (D) through LRs v. Chander Bhan and another about legal possession and parting with control.

The Court noted earlier authorities on the limits of revisional power in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others, Rai Chand Jain v. Chandra Kanta Khosla, Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan and Thankamony Amma and others v. Omana Amma N. and others, and endorsed that interference with findings of fact would be permissible only on narrow grounds. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment, restored the trial Court's eviction order and granted the respondents three months' time to vacate and hand over possession. There was no order as to costs.

Case Details:
Case No.: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4353 OF 2026
NeutralCitation: 2026 INSC 348
Case Title: SRI M.V. RAMACHANDRASA SINCE DECEASED REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS VERSUS M/S. MAHENDRA WATCH COMPANY REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNERS & ORS.

Source: 2026 CaseBase(SC) 306