Supreme Court grants bail in prolonged PMLA trial where only one of 225 witnesses was examined

A Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan heard the appeal filed by Udhaw Singh challenging continued detention under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The Court examined whether the appellant's continued incarceration would violate his right to a speedy trial where the trial was shown to be unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time.
The Court allowed the appeal and directed immediate steps for bail, holding that where a PMLA trial was not likely to be completed within a reasonable time, constitutional protections could justify enlargement on bail despite the statute's stringent bail regime. The Court noted that exceptional power of Constitutional Courts to grant relief must be exercised when continued detention would defeat Article 21 rights. The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "27. Under the Statutes like PMLA, the minimum sentence is three years, and the maximum is seven years. The minimum sentence is higher when the scheduled offence is under the NDPS Act. When the trial of the complaint under PMLA is likely to prolong beyond reasonable limits, the Constitutional Courts will have to consider exercising their powers to grant bail. The reason is that Section 45(1)(ii) does not confer power on the State to detain an accused for an unreasonably long time, especially when there is no possibility of trial concluding within a reasonable time. What a reasonable time is will depend on the provisions under which the accused is being tried and other factors. One of the most relevant factor is the duration of the minimum and maximum sentence for the offence. Another important consideration is the higher threshold or stringent conditions which a statute provides for the grant of bail. Even an outer limit provided by the relevant law for the completion of the trial, if any, is also a factor to be considered. The extraordinary powers, as held in the case of K.A. Najeeb, can only be exercised by the Constitutional Courts. The Judges of the Constitutional Courts have vast experience. Based on the facts on record, if the Judges conclude that there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a reasonable time, the power of granting bail can always be exercised by the Constitutional Courts on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the statutory provisions. The Constitutional Courts can always exercise its jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 226, as the case may be. The Constitutional Courts have to bear in mind while dealing with the cases under the PMLA that, except in a few exceptional cases, the maximum sentence can be of seven years. The Constitutional Courts cannot allow provisions like Section 45(1)(ii) to become instruments in the hands of the ED to continue incarceration for a long time when there is no possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence and the PMLA offence concluding within a reasonable time. If the Constitutional Courts do not exercise their jurisdiction in such cases, the rights of the undertrials under Article 21 of the Constitution of India will be defeated. In a given case, if an undue delay in the disposal of the trial of scheduled offences or disposal of trial under the PMLA can be substantially attributed to the accused, the Constitutional Courts can always decline to exercise jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs. An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary." The Court also observed that continued detention in such circumstances "will amount to an infringement of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India" (para 29).
Background The appellant had been in custody for one year and two months in proceedings under the PMLA. The trial docket listed 225 witnesses, of whom only one witness had been examined, prompting the Court to conclude that trial completion was not likely in the near future. The appellant sought bail before this Court after incarceration at the stage of trial. The respondent Enforcement Directorate opposed release. The Bench considered the precedents of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb and V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, and distinguished a recent coordinate Bench decision in Union of India through the Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad, noting the factual differences in the duration of custody and trial progress in that matter. The Solicitor General of India fairly accepted that the decision in V. Senthil Balaji applied to the facts before the Court. Applying those principles, the Court directed the Special Court to enlarge the appellant on bail on appropriate terms, including regular and punctual attendance, cooperation for early disposal of the case, and surrender of passport, if any. The Court ordered that the appellant be produced before the Special Court within one week and that the Special Court grant bail on the specified conditions. The appeal was allowed on those terms.
Case Details: Case No.: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.799 OF 2025 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) No.18369 of 2024) Case Title: Udhaw Singh v. Enforcement Directorate Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): [Senior Counsel for the Appellant — not named in order] For the Respondent(s): [Solicitor General of India — appeared for the Enforcement Directorate]