High Court Dismisses Appeal Against Vacation Of Interim Injunction In Trade‑name Dispute; Finds Suppression Of Material Facts

A bench of Justice Niral R. Mehta heard an appeal from order under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the trial court’s decision to reject an application for interim injunction and to vacate an ex‑parte ad‑interim injunction granted in Trademark Suit No.1 of 2025. The dispute concerned alleged infringement and passing off arising from the rival use of the expression “Kshetrapal” in the real estate and construction sector and competing trademark applications and registrations.

The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the trial court’s order refusing interim relief. The court held that the plaintiff had suppressed material facts and made misleading statements, and that the plaintiff’s registration was for a composite device mark declared as “proposed to be used,” which did not confer an exclusive right over the solitary word element “Kshetrapal.” The court applied the anti‑dissection rule under Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, observed the limited scope of Section 31’s prima facie presumption, and noted the protection available to a prior user under Section 34. The court also found that, given the deliberative nature of real estate purchases, likelihood of confusion was not shown on the prima facie record. The court quoted an authoritative passage on the plaintiff’s conduct and on composite marks. The Court, in its reasoning, observed: “Upon consideration of the facts of the present case, this Court is of the firm opinion that the plaintiff has approached the Court by making misleading statements and suppressing material facts, while presenting a distorted version of the factual matrix. This conclusion is drawn primarily from the circumstance that the plaintiff has failed to disclose the fundamental fact that the plaintiff and the defendant had jointly purchased the land and thereafter jointly launched the projects, namely, ‘Shree Kshetrapal Square‑1’ and ‘Shree Kshetrapal Square‑2.’ Such a material and crucial fact was withheld by the plaintiff while instituting the suit, thereby enabling the plaintiff to obtain an ex‑parte ad‑interim injunction at the initial stage.” The court further relied on the principle that “trademark similarity must be assessed by considering the mark as a whole” and that proprietors could not claim exclusive rights over non‑distinctive components.

Background The plaintiff claimed proprietary rights in a device mark incorporating the words “Shree Kshetrapal” and alleged that the defendant began business as “Kshetrapal Construction,” thereby infringing and passing off the plaintiff’s mark. The plaintiff said it had used the mark since 2015 and relied on a registered device mark (application No.6138925, registered after being declared “proposed to be used”), pending word‑mark application, and various corporate entities and project names. The trial court granted an ex‑parte ad‑interim injunction on 15.05.2025 but vacated it on 12.08.2025 after the defendant appeared, pleaded prior use, and filed evidence and an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4.

The defendant contended it had used “Kshetrapal Construction” since 2014, relied on development permissions, sale deeds, PAN details and third‑party affidavits, and had filed its own trademark application claiming use since 05.01.2014. The defendant also pointed to the plaintiff’s submissions before the Registrar that the registered mark was a distinctive device and that exclusivity was claimed only for the composite device mark, not the word alone. The trial court found material suppression and rejected the interim relief; the High Court agreed.

In applying Sections 9, 11, 17, 28, 31 and 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the High Court held that registration of a composite device mark conferred rights in the mark as a whole and did not permit dissection to claim monopoly over a non‑distinctive, religiously connotative word. The court found the plaintiff had not made a prima facie case of prior exclusive use in construction before the defendant, that Section 34 rights of a prior user could be invoked, and that likelihood of confusion was unlikely in the context of considered real estate transactions. The appeal was dismissed and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of Rs.50,000; the connected civil application for stay was also dismissed.

Case Details: Case No.: C/AO/207/2025 NeutralCitation: 2026:GUJHC:19273 Case Title: MR. ANIL GOPALJI THACKER Versus MR. DAVDA JAYDEEPKUMAR JAGDISHCHANDRA Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): Mr Harshit Tolia, Senior Advocate with Mr Pratik K Chaudhary For the Respondent(s): Mr Kamal B. Trivedi, Senior Advocate with Mr Shivang A Thacker; Mr Ar Thacker

(Niral R. Mehta, J.)