High Court Writ Not Entertained Where Statutory Forum Existed; Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal

A bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Aravind Kumar heard an appeal by special leave against a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, which had dismissed a writ petition filed by a person aggrieved by orders of confiscation and penalty under the Customs Act, 1962. The primary issue concerned whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain a petition under Article 226 when an alternative statutory remedy — including an appeal or reference under the Customs Act — was available and had not been pursued within the prescribed time.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal. The Court reiterated that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 was discretionary and ordinarily would not be exercised where an efficacious statutory remedy existed, particularly when the alternative forum designated by statute was the High Court itself. The Court observed that, where a statutory forum could dispense "speedy and efficacious relief," resort to writ jurisdiction would normally be refused, and that a party who had "disabled himself from availing himself of the statutory remedy" by his own fault could not expect the High Court to exercise discretion in his favour. The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "The jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up."

Background The dispute arose from seizure of allegedly smuggled silver (252.177 kgs) on 27 September 1992. By order dated 7 May 1996 the Commissioner of Customs ordered confiscation and imposed a penalty of Rs. 50,000 on the appellant. The appellant appealed to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) under Section 129A(1), and by order dated 23 June 2000 CEGAT sustained confiscation but reduced the penalty to Rs. 30,000. The appellant did not challenge the CEGAT order within the 180‑day period available for reference under Section 130 (as then applicable) and instead filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High Court on 18 March 2003, challenging both the confiscation order and the CEGAT order.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition largely because the appellant had not availed the statutory remedy and because the CEGAT had not been shown to have overlooked any pleaded point on confiscation. The High Court also noted that a criminal revisional court order of 14 May 2003 setting aside a Magistrate’s direction to return the seized silver had not been challenged by the appellant. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed well‑settled precedents including Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid and the A. V. Venkateswaran line of authority, and explained that where the statute itself designated the High Court as the forum for an alternative remedy, refusal to entertain a writ petition should be the rule and entertaining it would be the exception. The Court further held that the appellant could have sought condonation of delay under the Limitation Act and under the reference provisions, and that the writ petition lacked specific pleadings to demonstrate that points raised before CEGAT were left undecided. The Supreme Court therefore found no jurisdictional error in the High Court’s refusal to exercise its writ jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. No interim directions were granted; the impugned High Court order stood affirmed.

Case No.: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6719 OF 2012 Case Title: Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India & Ors. Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara, Advocate For the Respondent(s): Mr. Raghavendra P. Shankar, Additional Solicitor General