Supreme Court Holds Purchases Pendente Lite Are Bound by Lis Pendens; Directs Rs.75 lakh Payment to Vendees in Unique Settlement

A Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan heard the civil appeal arising from SLP(C) No. 14461 of 2019 and Civil Appeal No. 14761 of 2025, in which the appellants — auction-purchasers of land sold in execution of a bank decree — challenged a High Court order upholding a trial court decree in favour of vendees who had purchased part of the mortgaged property. The principal questions related to the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the scope of Order XXI CPC remedies (notably Rules 58, 89, 90, 92 and 99), and the bar under Section 47 CPC against separate suits by parties represented in execution proceedings.

Decision Summary The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the purchasers who acquired the suit parcel after institution of the recovery suit were pendente lite transferees and therefore bound by the outcome of the decree and the doctrine of lis pendens. The Court found the separate suit instituted by those vendees to be not maintainable: their rights stood to be governed by the execution scheme and they could not, after limitation had run for statutory execution remedies, maintain a collateral suit for declaration and possession. The Court emphasised that transfers during pendency of a suit affected the rights of others and could not be regularised simply by alleging later fraud in conduct of the auction.

The Court, in its reasoning, observed: “The following conditions ought to be fulfilled for the doctrine of lis pendens to apply:— i. There must be a pending suit or proceeding; ii. The suit or proceeding must be pending in a competent court; iii. The suit or proceeding must not be collusive; iv. The right to immovable property must be directly and specifically in question in the suit or proceeding; v. The property must be transferred by a party to the litigation; and vi. The alienation must affect the rights of any other party to the dispute.”

The judgment quoted Section 52 to underscore the public-policy foundation: “the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit ... except under the authority of the Court.” It also held that Rules 89–92 and 99–104 of Order XXI and Section 47 CPC must be read together to preclude collateral challenges where statutory execution remedies existed and were not invoked in time. In a limited equitable disposition to avoid protracted litigation given the forty-year lapse since the transactions, the Court directed the appellants to pay Rs. 75,00,000 to the vendees within six months, failing which interest at 12% per annum would run.

Background The dispute concerned a portion (24 kanals 11 marlas) of land mortgaged in 1970 for a bank loan. The bank obtained an ex parte decree in 1984 for recovery and foreclosure; execution proceedings followed and, after attachment, the entire mortgaged property was sold in auction in June 1988 to the appellants (sons of a judgment-debtor). Respondent nos.1 and 2 had bought two tranches of the suit parcel from a judgment-debtor in May and June 1985, and asserted title and mutation in revenue records. After confirmation of the execution sale and delivery of possession to appellants in 1989, the vendees alleged they were denied access and filed Suit No.353 of 1989 seeking a declaration that the sale was void and for possession. Trial court granted decree to the vendees; the appellate court and the High Court affirmed on findings of fraud and irregularity in the auction process and non-notice. The appellants appealed to this Court.

The Supreme Court examined whether the vendees’ purchases were hit by Section 52 and whether they had remedies under Order XXI (Rules 89, 90, 99) or were barred from a separate suit by Rule 92(3) and Section 47 CPC. The Court held that (i) the vendees were pendente lite transferees and lis pendens applied; (ii) Rule 89 relief required timely deposit (60 days) and could not be invoked long after sale confirmation; (iii) Rule 90 addressed material irregularity or fraud but required proof of “substantial injury” and was likewise time‑bound; (iv) where a dispossessed person’s remedy lay under Rule 99, pendente lite transferees were excluded by Rule 102; and (v) separate suits by persons who were parties to, or representatives of, the decree were barred by Section 47 CPC. Applying these principles, the Court found the vendees’ separate suit non‑maintainable, while, in exercise of equitable jurisdiction and given the passage of time, directed the specified monetary payment to the vendees.

Case Details: Case No.: 2025 INSC 1434 Case Title: Danesh Singh & Ors. v. Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Counsel For the Respondent(s): Ms. Aparajita Singh, Senior Counsel