Supreme Court quashes rape FIR under s.376(2)(n) as consensual relationship gone acrimonious

A bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan heard an appeal against the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur’s refusal to quash FIR No.213/2025 registered under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and the consequent chargesheet and sessions proceedings. The petition challenged the continuation of criminal proceedings arising from allegations that sexual relations were obtained by false promise of marriage.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order dated 03.03.2025, and quashed FIR No.213/2025, Chargesheet No.269/2025 and Sessions Case No.89/2025. The Court held that the material on record did not disclose ingredients of an offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and described the dispute as a “consensual relationship gone sour” rather than a case of repeated rape on the false pretext of marriage. The Court, in its reasoning, observed: “The Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in identifying the genuine cases filed under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC by identifying the essential ingredients to constitute the said offence i.e. there should be a promise of marriage made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations and without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. Such genuine cases that deserve prosecution of the accused must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises from the cases of consensual relationships between consenting adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and disagreement or a future change of mind.” The Court further noted that “a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings” and observed that the complainant, an advocate and a married woman with a child, was not “a naïve or gullible woman incapable of taking decisions for herself.”

Background The complainant, an advocate who married in 2011 and had a son, alleged that she developed a relationship with the accused—also an advocate—after meeting at a social event in September 2022. She lodged FIR No.213/2025 on 06.02.2025 accusing the accused of repeatedly raping her on the false promise of marriage and of forcing an abortion. The accused filed a complaint alleging harassment and sought anticipatory bail; the High Court granted anticipatory bail in MCRCA No.285/2025 on 03.03.2025 but dismissed the accused’s writ petition seeking quashment of the FIR in WPCR No.117/2025, observing that issues of consent and misconception of fact required investigation.

The police submitted Chargesheet No.269/2025 on 02.04.2025 and Sessions Case No.89/2025 was instituted. The Supreme Court considered precedent including Naim Ahamed v. State (2023), Mahesh Damu Khare (2024), Prashant (2025) and Bhajan Lal (1992), and emphasised that Section 376(2)(n) applied only where a promise of marriage was made from the outset with the sole object of obtaining consent and where the deception directly vitiated consent. The Court found no material to show that the accused “from the very beginning” intended to deceive the complainant into sex, and further held that because the complainant was married at all relevant times she was not legally eligible to enter a second marriage, undermining the premise of a promise capable of being acted upon. Applying Bhajan Lal principles, the Court concluded that the prosecution would amount to an abuse of process and therefore quashed the criminal proceedings. The appeal was allowed accordingly.

Case No.: 2026 INSC 124 Case Title: PRAMOD KUMAR NAVRATNA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & OTHERS Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): [Names not indicated in the judgment] For the Respondent(s): [Names not indicated in the judgment]