Supreme Court Tags Yeddyurappa SLPs to Larger Bench Over Applicability of Sanction Provisions in Court‑Directed Investigations

A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra heard the Special Leave Petitions filed by B.S. Yeddyurappa challenging the High Court order that restored proceedings in a criminal complaint alleging offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the IPC. The petitions raised substantial questions regarding the interplay between Section 17A and amended Section 19 of the PC Act and the power of a Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to direct investigation without prior sanction.

The Court summarized its conclusion that the key legal question — whether a Magistrate, while directing an investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., “takes cognizance” so as to render prior sanction under the PC Act necessary — was already referred to a larger bench in Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora. The Court noted that a coordinate bench in Shamin Khan v. Debashish Chakrabarty had observed that, on a prima facie reading, “while directing for an investigation and forwarding the complaint therefor, the Magistrate is not actually taking cognizance.” The Court, in its reasoning, observed: “We are of the considered view that scanning of the provisions under Sections 156(3), 173(2), 190, 200, 202, 203 and 204 of the CrPC would, prima facie, reveal that while directing for an investigation and forwarding the complaint therefor, the Magistrate is not actually taking cognizance. However, since the said question is referred as per the above judgment, judicial discipline and propriety dissuade us from proceeding further with the case and hence, we order to tag the captioned matters also along with the matter(s) already referred.” The Court therefore refrained from deciding the substantive questions and directed tagging of the petitions with the matter already referred to the larger bench.

Background The dispute arose from a complaint filed on 26.04.2012 by the first respondent against B.S. Yeddyurappa and others, alleging offences including under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. At the relevant time the petitioner had been Chief Minister of Karnataka. On 21.05.2012 a Magistrate, invoking Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., directed the Lokayukta police to investigate and an FIR was registered. A final report followed and cognizance was taken on 24.06.2013. The petitioner moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., relying on this Court’s decision in Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, which held that where there was no prior sanction the Magistrate could not order investigation against a public servant under Section 156(3). The High Court quashed the FIR on 11.10.2013; that order attained finality.

The first respondent filed a second complaint on 12.12.2013, alleging largely identical facts but asserting that the accused had ceased to hold office and therefore sanction under Section 19 was not required. The trial court dismissed the second complaint for lack of sanction on 26.08.2016. The High Court allowed the respondent’s petition and directed restoration of the original proceedings, except insofar as sanction had been denied for one accused. The petitioner challenged that order before the Supreme Court.

The petitions raised multiple questions: the scope of considerations under Section 17A of the PC Act for grant of approval; whether those considerations differed fundamentally from the test applied by a Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.; the interplay between Section 19’s provisos and magisterial proceedings under Sections 200–203 Cr.P.C.; and whether the 2018 amendments to the PC Act were substantive or procedural and their retrospective effect. The respondents relied on precedent holding that a Magistrate did not take cognizance when directing investigation under Section 156(3) and contended that Section 17A did not bar court‑directed investigations.

While the Court framed the above issues for determination, it found that the central question concerning the nature of magisterial action under Section 156(3) was already referred to a larger bench in Manju Surana. The Court reproduced a coordinate‑bench order in Shamin Khan which stated that the referred question was involved and that “judicial discipline and propriety dissuade us from proceeding further”. Consequently, the Court did not decide the merits and ordered that these petitions be tagged with the matter already referred for consideration by the larger bench. The registry was directed to place the matters before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

Case Details: Case No.: SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Crl.) No.520/2021 (with connected SLPs) Case Title: B.S. YEDDIYURAPPA v. A. ALAM PASHA & ORS. Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): [Names not specified in order] For the Respondent(s): [Names not specified in order]