Supreme Court revisits High Court’s Power of Revision under CrPC-BNSS on reappreciation of evidence
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Reaffirming the narrow boundaries of revision under CrPC and BNSS, the Supreme Court ruled that High Courts cannot act as appellate forums to overturn concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 without demonstrating explicit perversity. The Apex Court discussed the contours of law on reappreciation of evidence and the High Court’s power of revision under BNSS and CrPC.
A Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan set aside a Karnataka High Court order that had acquitted an accused by re-evaluating the financial capacity of the complainant. The Bench restored the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court as modified by the appellate court.
Key Takeaways
- High Court Power of Revision under BNSS-CrPC: High Courts cannot embark on an in-depth appreciation of evidence under Section 397 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 unless the findings below are perverse or glaringly erroneous.
- Presumption Mandate: Once signature execution on a cheque is admitted, statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 automatically shift the burden of proof onto the accused.
- Financial Capacity Defences: An accused must explicitly raise the complainant's lack of financial capacity at the earliest stage in response to the statutory demand notice, rather than creating post-facto defences during trial.
- Evidentiary Value of Delayed Notices: Rebuttal legal notices issued long after the initiation of criminal proceedings hold little to no evidentiary value and constitute an afterthought.
High Court’s Power of Revision under CrPC-BNSS and Presumptions
The Supreme Court emphasized that Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was enacted to inculcate faith in banking operations and business credibility. Re-evaluating the statutory framework. The Apex Court noted that once the drawer admits their signature on a cheque, mandatory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arise, placing the onus on the accused to disprove the existence of a legally enforceable debt through cogent evidence.
Reappreciation of Evidence by High Court
Addressing the Karnataka High Court's interference, the Supreme Court pointed out that High Court’s power of revision is supervisory and strictly intended to correct miscarriages of justice rather than re-analyze facts. The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction."
Highlighting the legal principles established in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. vs. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. ( "(2000) 2 SCC 745": 1999 CaseBase(SC) 983), the Bench held that the drawer must bring on record facts making the non-existence of debt highly probable. Paraphrasing the ratio in Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets ( "(2009) 2 SCC 513": 2008 CaseBase(SC) 1572) and State of Maharashtra vs. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, the Court reiterated that High Courts should refrain from substituting their own conclusions on evidence when two lower courts have reached concurrent findings. The Supreme Court also applied State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, confirming that in the absence of jurisdictional errors or perversity, revisional courts cannot upset factual determinations.
Ratio
Under Section 397 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a Revisional Court cannot re-appreciate oral and documentary evidence or substitute its own factual conclusions for concurrent findings of lower courts, unless the decision under challenge is demonstrably perverse, glaringly erroneous, or legally untenable. Once the execution of a cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 bind the court to presume consideration and legal liability until the accused discharges the burden of proof with plausible and timely material.
Background
The complainant had extended a hand loan of Rs. 4,50,000/- to the accused in December 2010 for purchasing a house site. To discharge the debt, the accused issued a cheque dated March 20, 2013, which was returned unpaid due to "funds insufficient." Following the failure of the accused to pay despite a demand notice, the complainant filed a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 read with Section 200 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 9,00,000/-. The Appellate Court upheld the conviction but reduced the fine to Rs. 6,50,000/-. However, the Karnataka High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction, set aside the conviction, reasoning that the complainant failed to prove his financial capacity to lend such an amount given his monthly income of Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 25,000/-.
Reversing the High Court's ruling, the Supreme Court observed that the complainant had adequately explained sourcing funds through relatives, supported by witness statements. The Apex Court held that the accused’s defense, claiming misuse of a blank security cheque, was an unevidenced, ex post facto attempt to manufacture a defense, restoring the trial and appellate court orders.
Case Details:
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2247 of 2024)
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 790
Case Title: Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah
Source: 2026 CaseBase(SC) 721
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