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SC: State-Imposed Ban on Journal Circulation Violates Free Speech Rights

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The Supreme Court struck down a State order banning the entry and circulation of a weekly journal, reinforcing that the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the essential right of circulation. A six-judge bench comprising Chief Justice Kania, Justice Patanjali Sastri, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice Mukherjea, Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, and Justice Fazl Ali (who dissented) adjudicated the matter, which questioned whether legislative restrictions on 'public order' could validly curtail fundamental rights under the Constitution of India, 1950.

Direct Access to Supreme Court for Fundamental Rights

The Court first addressed a preliminary objection regarding whether a petitioner must exhaust remedies in the High Court under Article 226 before approaching the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950. Drawing a distinction from American practice and ordinary procedural rules under the Criminal Procedure Code or Civil Procedure Code, the Court held that Article 32 provides a guaranteed fundamental right for the enforcement of other rights.

The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "Article 32 provides a 'guaranteed' remedy for the enforcement of those rights, and this remedial right is itself made a fundamental right by being included in Part III. This Court is thus constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against infringements of such rights."

'Public Order' vs 'Security of the State'

The core controversy involved Section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The Court examined whether laws made for 'public order' or 'public safety' fell within the exceptions of Article 19(2), which at the time only permitted restrictions for matters that 'undermine the security of, or tend to overthrow, the State.' The Court noted that the Constitution makers intentionally set narrow limits for abridging free speech, even deleting the word 'sedition' during the drafting process. It was observed that while all riots or disorders involve public order, not all of them reach the gravity of undermining the security of the State.

The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is possible."

Striking Down the Ban

The Court held that since the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 was worded widely enough to cover situations that did not necessarily endanger the State, it was not severable and must be declared void in its entirety. The Court concluded that freedom of speech includes the 'freedom of propagation of ideas,' which is ensured by the freedom of circulation, citing principles from Ex parte Jackson and LoveIl v. City of Griffin.

Background:

The petitioner, the editor of the English weekly journal 'Cross Roads' published in Bombay, challenged an order issued by the Government of Madras on March 1, 1950. The order, issued under Section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, prohibited the entry and circulation of the journal in Madras to secure 'public safety' and 'public order.' The petitioner contended this violated Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, 1950. The State argued that 'public safety' was synonymous with the security of the Province. However, the Court distinguished between 'public order' a wide concept and the 'security of the State' a specific, aggravated form of disorder. Relying on the distinction between minor local breaches and threats to the State's foundation, the Court quashed the ban. Justice Fazl Ali dissented, referencing his views in Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State, arguing that disorders affecting public peace do indeed undermine the security of the State.

Case Details:
Case No.: Petition No. XVI of 1950
Case Title: ROMESH THAPPAR Vs. THE STATE OF MADRAS
Appearances:
For the Petitioner(s): C.R. Pattabhi Raman, Advocate
For the Respondent(s): K. Rajah Ayyar, Advocate-General of Madras; Ganapathi Ayyar, Advocate

Source: 1950 CaseBase(SC) 71