Supreme Court Holds Apology Can Remit Contempt Sentence Where Remorse Is Genuine

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard an appeal against a Bombay High Court order finding a former company director guilty of criminal contempt for issuing a public circular that imputed improper motives to the judiciary and sentenced her to one week’s simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000. The matter raised the issue whether the High Court was justified in declining to accept an apology and in imposing punishment under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s sentence to the extent indicated and remitted the punishment after holding that, while the circular satisfied the ingredients of criminal contempt, the High Court erred in refusing to accept an apology that, on the record, manifested genuine remorse. The Court emphasised that “mercy, therefore, must remain an integral part of the judicial conscience” and that the statutory scheme under Section 12 contemplated not only punishment but also remission where repentance was shown. The Court, in its reasoning, observed: “Although Section 12 of the Contempt Act bears the marginal note ‘punishment for contempt of court’, a holistic reading of the provision indicates that it contemplates not merely the imposition of punishment but also the power to remit the same. The proviso and the Explanation to Section 12 recognise that where the contemnor expresses genuine remorse and tenders an apology to the satisfaction of the Court, he may be discharged, or the sentence awarded may be remitted. Even after a finding of guilt and the imposition of punishment, the Court retains the discretion to exercise such power. The statutory scheme is thus clear, once repentance is demonstrated, the Court may act with magnanimity. However, the apology must be bona fide and must satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court, which is required to exercise this discretion judiciously.” The Court further quoted the judgment’s opening principle that “the power to punish necessarily carries within it the concomitant power to forgive,” underlining that an apology should not be rejected merely because it is qualified if it was made bona fide.

Background

The dispute arose when the appellant, a former Director (Cultural) of Seawoods Estates Ltd., issued a circular dated 29 January 2025 which criticised the judiciary in strong terms and alleged a “dog feeder’s mafia” with influence in the judicial system. A party who had intervened in an existing writ petition challenging Rule 20 of the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023, placed the circular on record before the Bombay High Court. The High Court treated the matter suo motu as a criminal contempt petition, issued show-cause notice and recorded that the circular “was contemptuous in nature.” Seawoods disavowed the circular and the appellant promptly filed a reply affidavit in which she accepted that a “grave error was committed,” tendered an unqualified apology, attributed the lapse to pressure from residents and resigned from the board.

The High Court, however, found that the circular scandalised the Court, interfered with pending judicial proceedings and was issued with intent to disrepute the judiciary; it therefore convicted the appellant under Section 2(c) read with Section 12 of the Contempt Act and sentenced her to one week’s simple imprisonment and a fine. On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted that the act met the ingredients of criminal contempt but held that the High Court erred in declining to accept the apology and in relying on precedents whose ratios were factually distinguishable. The Court applied settled principles that the ratio decidendi of earlier judgments must be read in context, distinguished cases where no apology had been offered or where the allegations were of greater gravity, and concluded that in the absence of material impugning the bona fides of the apology the High Court should have considered remission under the proviso and Explanation to Section 12. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the sentence imposed by the High Court and allowed the appeal.

Case Details: Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 2267 of 2025 (2025 INSC 1408) Case Title: Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its own motion Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): Appearing counsel not indicated in the judgment For the Respondent(s): Appearing counsel not indicated in the judgment